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Book Review

FREE SPEECH IN ITS FORGOTIEN YEARS. By
David M. Rabban. 1 Cambridge University Press. 1997.
Pp. xi, 404.
2

Daniel A. Farber

Rip Van Winkle-like, the First Amendment slumbered from
1800 to 1920. Or so we are accustomed to think. The typical
constitutional law book speaks briefly of the origins of the First
Amendment, devotes a few paragraphs to the Alien and Sedition
Acts, and then leaps a century to the great dissents of Holmes
and Brandeis. In the interim, free speech lay dormant as an issue.
That, at least, is the conventional wisdom. As David Rabban and others have shown, however, the conventional wisdom
is wrong. It is true that the Supreme Court did not begin vigorously defending freedom of speech until well into the Twentieth
century. But free speech was far from being a forgotten issue
during the Nineteenth century. Free speech was a rallying cry
for the anti-slavery forces which ultimately formed the Republican party, and remained a lively issue during the Civil War. 3
And, as Rabban has demonstrated, free speech continued to find
its advocates even during the generally repressive years from the
end of Reconstruction through World War I. Much of this period is little remembered today-how many people can name the
Presidents from 1870 to 1920, let alone Supreme Court Justices?
Yet we cannot expect to fully understand the later, more dramatic developments of the Twentieth century without grasping
this background.

1. Thomas Shelton Maxey Professor of Law, University of Texas.
2. Associate Dean for Faculty and Research, and Henry J. Fletcher Professor of
Law, University of Minnesota.
3. See, e.g., Michael Kent Curtis, The Curious History of Attempts to Suppress
Anti-Slavery Speech, Press, and Petition in 1835-37,89 Nw. U. L. Rev. 785 (1995).
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With respect to the First Amendment, Rabban can take the
primary credit among legal scholars for rediscovering this forgotten period of American law. His book sheds light on this shadowy corner of legal history, in the process raising puzzling questions about nineteenth century constitutional thought. I will first
sketch his findings, and then offer some musings about the repressive caselaw of the day.
I

Several parts of Rabban 's story are particularly striking.
He begins with the saga of the "lost tradition of libertarian radicalism." (p. 23) Much of the ire of these forgotten libertarians
was directed at the Comstock Act, which banned "obscene"
mailings. The Comstock Act was passed in response to an unsuccessful criminal prosecution under an earlier statute-a
prosecution aimed, not at what we would consider today to be
pornography, but at a newspaper article alleging that the Reverend Henry Ward Beecher had had an affair with his best friend's
wife. (p. 29) The targets of prosecution under the new law included birth control tracts (p. 30); pamphlets attacking marriage
as oppressive to women and advocating "free love" (p. 34); advertising for contraceptives (p. 39); and portions of Whitman's
Leaves of Grass. (p. 41) In response, the Free Speech League
was formed under the leadership of legal scholar Theodore
Schroeder. (p. 47) Like the ACLU of today, it defended speech
of all kinds, including socialists, sexual libertarians, and others.
(p. 48) Thus, Schroeder, with the help of the West Publishing
Company, (p. 62) collected cases on advertising, blasphemy, obscenity, treason, and other categories of forbidden speech. (p.
63)
A second arena of free speech controversy involved the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW). The "Wobblies" made a
point of using street corners for inflammatory speeches, exploiting the predictable police response as evidence of capitalist
repression. (p. 87) The shrewdest police commissioners, in
places like Denver and New York City, defused the controversies by protecting the IWW's right to free speech. (p. 101)
Other cities allowed speech, but only outside the central business
district, which many considered a sufficient opportunity for expression. (pp. 110-16) Thus, as Rabban says, free speech was a
live public issue during the late Nineteenth century, "[t]he general public, officials at various levels of government, and even
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members of the IWW expressed a wide range of views," often in
terms "more sophisticated analytically, and more sensitive to
free speech concerns, than typical judicial decisions of the period." (p. 128) (I will return to the question of the judicial decisions later.)
Another arena of active debate was legal scholarship. Contrary to the current conventional wisdom, Zechariah Chafee, Jr.,
did not originate free speech as a topic for scholarship. Rabban
discusses the work of five influential earlier scholars- two of
them remembered primarily for other reasons today, another
who is more obscure (Freund), and two others (Schroeder and
Schofield) who are almost entirely forgotten. For instance,
Thomas Cooley is usually remembered today (erroneously, according to Paul Carrington4 ), as the apostle of Lochnerism. Actually, even his views on economic regulation were more liberal
than that, and he was by nineteenth century standards a strong
civil libertarian on speech issues.' He advocated broad protection for speech on topics of public concern, stressing that the
press is "one of the chief means for the education of the people."
(p. 201, see also pp. 197, 205)
Other scholars also spoke out against narrow readings of
the First Amendment. Roscoe Pound, the noted legal realist and
Dean of the Harvard Law School, opposed the Blackstonian interpretation, which held the First Amendment merely to be a
prohibition on prior restraints. (p. 192) Ernst Freund, a law
professor at the University of Chicago, argued that advocates of
anarchist views were protected by the First Amendment. (p.
198) He also anticipated today's public forum doctrine, rejecting
the view of most courts that the government had absolute control of speech on public property. (p. 209) Schroeder, whose
work with the Free Speech League was mentioned earlier, inveighed against the obscenity laws. (p. 199) He would have allowed punishment only given "the imminent danger of actual
4. See Paul Carrington, Law As "The Common Thoughts Of Men": The
Law-Teaching And Judging Of Thomas Mcintyre Cooley, 49 Stan. L. Rev. 495 (1997).
For more on conservative supporters of free speech during this period, see Mark Graber,
Transforming Free Speech: The Ambiguous Legacy of Civil Libertarianism 17-49 (U. of
Cal. Press, 1991 ).
5. Some of Cooley's judicial opinions on the subject are also quite notable. See
Miner v. Post & Tribune Co., 13 N.W. 773 (1882) (requiring the plaintiff to prove malice
in a defamation case involving matters of public concern); Atkinson v. Detroit Free Press
Co., 9 N.W. 501 (1881) (Cooley, 1., dissenting) (holding critics of public officials "to the
strict and literal truth of every statement, recital and possible inference" would "subject
the right [of public criticism] to conditions making any attempt at public discussion practically worthless").
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and material injury." (p. 207) Finally, Henry Schofield, a professor at Northwestern, anticipated New York Times v. Sullivan 6
by arguing that the First Amendment abolished seditious libel.
(p. 195) (As an aside, it seems to me that it speaks poorly of the
legal academy that we have such little memory of our own history, so that even Pound and Cooley are only vaguely remembered and the others are slipping out of sight entirely.)
A final, striking part of the story is the position taken by
many progressives such as John Dewey. Until the disillusion of
the post-World War I years, progressives were dubious about the
conception of rights as unduly individualistic, and similarly unenthusiastic about freedom of speech. They had no patience for
dissenting voices other than their own. (p. 218) (Sound familiar?) Dewey ridiculed radicals who protested censorship by invoking "all the early Victorian political platitudes," including
"the sanctity of individual rights and constitutional guaranties."
(pp. 246-47) Only after the war did Dewey emerge as an advocate of free speech. (p. 338) He continued, however, to reject
the "individualistic" justification for civil liberties (p. 339);
stressing instead the contribution of free speech to the public
welfare. (p. 340)
How did all of this history come to be forgotten? The progressives, no doubt, were not eager to call attention to the
change in their own position after the war. They were also anxious to disassociate themselves from the pre-war disputes over
civil liberties for two reasons. First, many of the pre-war advocates of free speech, whether sexual libertarians or Wobblies,
were political embarrassments. They were associated with labor
violence like the IWW, or with disreputable views of sexuality
involving issues ranging from public nudity to birth control.
Second, the very existence of the pre-war disputes about free
speech was best forgotten. By adopting the Rip Van Winkle
story and assuming away the history between the Alien and Sedition Acts and World War I, the progressives avoided the necessity of confronting decades of unfavorable judicial precedents.
Indeed, according to Rabban, Chafee deliberately
concealed the existence of numerous First Amendment decisions, in order to argue that the World War I courts were unsupported by precedent. (p. 5) These restrictive decisions are discussed below.

6.

376 u.s. 254 (1964).
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II

It is tempting to bury the mistakes of our predecessors, dismissing them as merely the benighted product of a backward
age. But, for all their failings, nineteenth century lawyers and
judges were not hostile to the concept of free speech. A minority tried to move the law toward greater protection of free
speech. Even the repressive majority consistently acknowledged
the value of speech and acted on occasion to curb efforts at censorship. If they had been truly hostile to speech, they would
have missed no opportunity to support suppression. Thus, the
story is more complicated and deserves fuller discussion.
Rabban's primary focus is on the advocates of free speech,
rather than their opponents, and so it is understandable that he
devotes relatively little attention to the judicial opinions of the
period. His treatment of the opinions seems largely dedicated to
making two points.
Rabban's first point about the case law is that, contrary to
the conventional wisdom stemming from Chafee's day, there was
in fact a substantial body of judicial opinions about free speech,
and they were largely dismissive of First Amendment claims.
Indeed, "from the Civil War to World War I, the overwhelming
majority of decisions in all jurisdictions rejected free speech
claims," and "[n]o court was more unsympathetic to freedom of
expression than the Supreme Court." (p. 131) Certainly, by late
twentieth century standards, most judges were shockingly unreceptive to First Amendment claims.
A few illustrations may serve to show the overall tenor of
the judicial decisions. Consider two Minnesota cases. In State v.
7
Pioneer Press Co., a state law prohibited any newspaper accounts of an execution "beyond the statement of the fact that
such convict was on the day in question duly executed according
to law." As the court said, the "evident purpose of the act was to
surround the execution of criminals with as much secrecy as possible, in order to avoid exciting an unwholesome effect on the
public mind." 8 The court rejected the claim that "there are no
constitutional limitations upon the liberty of the press, unless the
subject-matter be blasphemous, obscene, seditious, or scandal-

7. 110 N.W. 867 (Minn. 1907). Another striking case is State v. Haffer, 162 P. 45
(Wash. 1916) (upholding a criminal prosecution for defaming the memory of George
Washington).
8. Id. at 868.
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9

ous in its character." Instead, the court said, the "principle is
the same" whenever a publication is "of such character as naturally tends to excite the public mind and thus indirectly affect the
10
public good. " Thus, the court upheld an indictment against the
newspaper for describing an execution.
Another case, about a decade later, involved what would
now be called "hate speech." 11 The mayor of Minneapolis had
banned what the court called a "photoplay," The Birth of aNation. Among the community members consulted by the mayor,
some denounced the play as historically false, as a "humiliating
caricature" of blacks, and as "'canonizing' the lawlessness of the
Ku Klux Klan. " 12 Also, there was "some evidence that the production of the play in Minneapolis has resulted in disparaging
remarks regardin§ negroes and in subjecting them to indignities
in public places." 3 Finding that the question of license revocation was "one that calls for the exercise of official discretion,"
the court concluded that "reasonable people might differ as to
the advisability of permitting the exhibition of this play"; hence,
the mayor's action was upheld. 14 Notably, the court seemed
oblivious to even the possibility that free speech might have
been an issue in the case. 15 Indeed, a few years later, the Supreme Court held that movie theatres were merely a form of
public entertainment, like vaudeville, "not to be regarded [as]
16
part of the press of the country or as organs of public opinion."
While many judges may have been oblivious to what we
would now consider blatant censorship, others were not. Rabban's second point about the case law is that minority support
for free speech did exist, showing that the prevailing opinion was
not unchallenged. Legal protection for freedom of speech was
"thinkable" by judges of the time; it was simply not a position
that most accepted. Given the existence of these dissident
opinions, Rabban says, we must conclude that the "possibility of
substantial legal protection for speech" was within "the conceptual universe of American judges before World War 1." (p. 132)
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Bainbridge v. City of Minneapolis, 154 N.W. 964 (Minn. 1915).
12. ld. at 966.
13. Id.
14. !d.
15. In a striking replay, the Minnesota Supreme Court was equally sympathetic to
regulation of hate speech a century later in R.A. V. v. St. Paul, 464 N.W.2d 507 (Minn.
1991 ), rev'd, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
16. Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n of Ohio, 236 U.S. 230 (1915).
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Some of these deviant opinions are quite striking in presaging themes of later First Amendment law. The best known
7
case is undoubtedly Coleman v. MacLennan/ which the Su18
preme Court later relied on in New York Times v. Sullivan.
Coleman recognized a privilege to make statements about public
officials "which are untrue in fact, although made in good faith,
19
without malice and under the honest belief that they are true. "
The court rejected a narrower rule of fair comment as "leav(ing)
no greater freedom for the discussion of matters of the gravest
public concern than it does for the discussion of the character of
20
a private individual. "
In another decision with modern resonance, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court struck down an early effort at campaign finance
reform. 21 A state law prohibited ordinary citizens from spending
money outside their own county for political purposes (political
parties and candidates were exempt). "If this be not an abridgment of freedom of speech," the court said, "it would be difficult
to imagine what would be. " 22 According to the court, the statute
would merely operate as a roadblock to reform, which usually
results from private agitation long before any formal political
party has taken up the cause. Yet under the statute, "no man, or
group of men, can do a stroke of political work involving expense in any other county than their own, however legitimate
and praiseworthy be the means which are used." 23 (Shades of
Buckley v. Valeo!t
A third example of the minority view is a New Jersey case
regarding seditious speech, decided on the eve of World War 1. 25
A state law made it a crime to "attempt by speech, writing,
printing or in any other way whatsoever to incite or abet, promote or encourage hostility or opposition to any and all government."26 The defendant was indicted for having made a vehement (and according to the court, probably libelous) attack on
17. 98 P. 281 (Kan. 1908).
18. 376 u.s. 254 (1964).
19. Coleman, 98 P. at 286.
20. !d. at 292. Law and economics devotees may also be interested in another of
the court's comments: "good reputation honestly earned is not only one of the most satisfying sources of a man's own contentment, but from a commercial standpoint it is one
of the most productive kinds of capital he can possess." I d. at 285.
21. State v. Pierce, 158 N.W. 696 (Wis. 1916).
22. !d. at 698.
23. !d.
24. 424 u.s. 1 (1976 ).
25. Stare v. Scali, 90 A. 235 (N.J. 1914).
26. !d.
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the Patterson, N.J., police force, and having thereby "then and
there wickedly, unlawfully, and maliciously attempted to encourage hostility and opposition to the government of the city of
27
Patterson. " The court pointed out that the law had been passed
as the "product of feverish and political excitement" caused by
the McKinley assassination. 28 The "great danger in enacting
statutes under the stress of great public excitement and pressure," the court remarked, is that "such legislation is very apt to
reflect the crude and undigested sentiment of a public uRheaval
at the cost of encroachments on constitutional rights." Construing the statute more broadly, the court said, "would silence
the public press, and preclude it from bringing into the light of
day the evil spots in the administration of municipal and state affairs."30 If only this sentiment had been more influential after
the war broke out later that year.
Although these libertarian opinions are cheering, they were
a distinct minority. More prevalent, as Rabban shows, were the
many cases in which free speech claims were brushed aside under the "bad tendency" test or ignored by courts entirely. First
Amendment claims were not unknown during these "forgotten
years," they were merely, on the whole, unsuccessful.
These repressive rulings, which Rabban must be credited
with rediscovering, deserve closer attention than he gives them.
For these cases raise a puzzle. During the Civil War period,
freedom of expression had significant support from important
political figures- first the pre-war Republicans, who denounced
southern suppression of anti-slavery speech, and then their opponents, who denounced the suppression of dissenters during
the War. 31 Thus, the value of free speech had not been forgotten
by society at the beginning of Rabban's story. And, as he makes
clear, the legal thinking of the day provided some support for
greater protection, had courts chosen to use them. What, then,
accounts for the submergence of free speech claims from 1870 to
1920?
It seems clear that the courts did not reject the concept of
free speech or embrace censorship in principle. Even the least
sympathetic tribunals seemed willing to provide some protection
27. Id. at 235-36.
28. ld. at 236.
29. Id.
30. ld. at 237
31. See also United States v. Hall, 26 F. Cas. 79 (S.D. Ala. 1871) (holding free
speech to be a "privilege and immunity" of United States citizenship).
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to speech at the mar9in. Postal regulations are a case in point.
In Ex Parte Jackson, 2 the Court upheld for the first time the
power of Congress to exclude materials (in this case, lottery advertisements) from the mails based on content. The Court began with a broad principle: Congressional power "embraces the
regulation of the entire postal system of the country," and the
"right to designate what shall be carried necessarily involves the
right to determine what shall be excluded." 33 In the Court's
view, "the object of Congress has not been to interfere with the
freedom of the press, or with any other rights of the people; but
to refuse its facilities for the distribution of matter deemed inju34
rious to the public morals." Thus, excluding literature from the
mails raised no First Amendment problem. From our current
perspective, of course, this is a Neanderthal opinion in its willingness to license such broad restrictions on the mail (though it
is only in the last twenty years that a lottery ad would have received First Amendment protection at all). But even so, the
opinion is not completely hostile to individual liberties. The
Court emphasized that letters and sealed packages were fully
protected by the Fourth Amendment against any government
surveillance; in addition, if Congress did choose to exclude some
printed material from the mails, it could not prevent their dissemination by other means without violating the right to free
speech. For, the Court said, if Congress could ban both the use
of the mails and other forms of transportation, "the circulation
of the documents would be destroyed, and a fatal blow given to
the freedom of the press."
In later cases, the Court rejected expansive readings of
postal statutes. In American School of Magnetic Healing v.
35
McAnnulty, the Court blocked efforts to prevent mailings by a
business offering to heal illnesses through the "innate power" of
the brain. There being no standard of "absolute truth" applicable to medical treatments, the utility of a treatment is "a question of opinion in all the cases, and although we may think the
opinion may be better founded and based upon a more intelligent and a longer experience in some cases than in others, yet
after all it is in each case opinion only, and not existing facts with
36
which these cases deal." In short, the Court said, "[u]nless the
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

96 U.S. 727 (1877).
ld. at 732.
Id. at 736.
187 U.S. 94 (1902).
ld. at 107.
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question may be reduced to one of fact as distinguished from
mere opinion," the statute did not apply. 37 In Swearigen v.
United States, 38 the Court reversed an indictment for mailing a
newspaper editorial. The editorial, calling the plaintiff "a liar,
perjurer, and slanderer," a "black hearted coward," and a "companion of negro strumpets [who] revelled in [the] lowest debauches. " 39 Calling the newspaper article "exceedingly coarse
and vulgar, and, as applied to an individual person, plainly libelous," the Court nevertheless could not "perceive in it anything
of a lewd, lascivious and obscene tendency, calculated to corrupt
and debauch the mind and morals of those into whose hands it
might fall. " 40 Four Justices dissented, so obviously this was not
an inevitable reading of the statute.
This is not to deny Rabban's basic conclusion that the courts
were generally inhospitable when confronted with First
Amendment claims, but they cannot simply be characterized as
"hostile" to free speech. Pending further historical investigation,
we can at least speculate about several factors that may have
contributed to the generally unfavorable response. Here are
some plausible candidates.
Lack of salience. The major issues of the day were economic, especially struggles between labor and business. Free
speech seemed like a peripheral concern compared to these
burning issues. Moreover, given the amount of dissent, the rise
of "yellow journalism," the level of public unrest, and the general weakness of government compared to today, the threat of
truly repressing public discourse may have seemed chimeric.
Both liberals and conservatives, in other words, had "other fish
to fry." Thus, there was little to oppose the legal inertia of past
doctrine.
Fear of chaos. In reading Rabban's descriptions of the
cases, and casually dipping into a few on my own, I had the sense
of pervasive anxiety about maintaining social order. The opinions have an aura of fear that basic social order was breaking
down, a fear undoubtedly fed by labor unrest, massive immigration, attempted revolutions in Europe, the rise of mass culture,
and the whole process of industrialization. Courts seemed most

37.
38.
39.
40.

!d. at 106.
161 u.s. 446 (1896).
ld. at 247 n.l.
!d. at 451.
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protective of their own domain, liberally using contempt sanc41
tions to fend off efforts to exert political pressure on them.
Legal culture. In the legal thinking of the time, the common
law had a special status as a kind of embodiment of natural
(economic) law. In key areas such as defamation and contempt,
the common law was quite anti-libertarian; this stance then
seemed natural and uncontroversial. Also, the formalist thinking of the time was unsympathetic to the idea of "unconstitutional conditions," so it is unsurprising that the Court saw few
constitutional barriers to controlling speech on public property,42
43
by immigrants, or through federal facilities like the mails. In
addition, for a formalist, it is difficult to take a moderate position, because formalism does not lend itself to gradations of legal
protection. Faced with a stark choice between categorical protection of speech and categorical regulation, conservative formalists opted for regulation.
Quite likely, each of these explanations played some role:
any threat to personal liberty did not seem pressing; the public
interest in maintaining social order seemed to be at risk; and
many forms of repression seemed "natural" in light of the legal
culture of the day. But of course, assuming that these factors
were indeed operative, they did not operate equally at all times
and all places, and a much fuller historical account would be
needed before drawing any firm conclusions.
A better understanding of the Dark Age of American law
might help shed light on later developments. There has been
considerable discussion of the post-World War I revival of the
First Amendment, including much debate about changing views
of particular individuals such as Holmes, (pp. 342-71) but there
has been comparatively little attention to the regressive views
that were being rejected. If the three factors discussed above account for the unsympathetic reception of First Amendment
claims from 1870 to 1920, their waning may help account for the
revival of those claims thereafter. First, because of War War I
and its aftermath, free speech issues had become more salient,
having attracted the attention of mainstream progressives (a
process Rabban explores in detail). Moreover, the wartime experience had shown that the threat of systematic repression of

41.
striking
42.
43.

Justice Holmes· opinion in Pauerson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454 (1907), is a
example.
See Davis v. Massachuselts, 167 U.S. 43 (IX97).
Turner v. Williams, I 94 U.S. 279 (I 904 ).
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opinion was real. Second, at least in some quarters, fears of unrest may have been muted by social changes such as the end of
massive immigration, or perhaps concerns arose that excessively
harsh repression would only fuel unrest. In retrospect, the massive repression prompted by World War I must have seemed a
hysterical overreaction to a minor threat. And third, the legal
culture that made many restrictions on speech seem natural was
eroded by the rise of legal realism. .The fact that the common
law had long allowed broad restrictions on speech was perhaps
less likely to be seen as a sufficient justification.
All this, of course, is speculation. My point is not to argue
for any particular explanation of the post-1920 developments,
but only to suggest that a better understanding of the roots of
the earlier climate of repression might help illuminate the later
change.
Trying to fit the development of First Amendment doctrine
into some overall conception of the evolution of American society and legal culture would surely be a daunting task. Probably
wisely, Rabban did not attempt such an analysis. But what he
has done instead is significant enough. In the course of his research, he has unearthed a lost world of legal thought. By
bringing the First Amendment's "forgotten years" back to light,
he has done all of us a great service.

